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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Issues

This memorandum examines two issues related to crimes against humanity as defined in
Article 5 of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) Statute. First,
whether all of the offenses listed in Article 5 were part of customary international law and
applicable to Cambodia in 1975. Because the Cambodian tribunal was established nearly thirty
years after the Khmer Rouge perpetrated crimes against the Cambodian population, it is
necessary to show that the crimes described in the ECCC Statute were either part of customary
international law or of Cambodian law in 1975, the year the Khmer Rouge began its campaign
against the people of Cambodia.1 This inquiry is necessary as the ECCC may not be able to
prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders if the charged crimes were not based in international law or part
of Cambodian law in 1975 due to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.2
The second issue relating to Article 5 of the ECCC Statute is what evidentiary threshold
and types of evidence are available to establish the requisite discriminatory intent for the listed
offenses of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity as defined in Article 5 of the
ECCC Statute, requires a requisite intent or “mens rea.” Proving the state of mind of the
individual defendant presents particular problems, especially when evidence may be limited due

1

See Herbert D. Bowman, Not Worth the Wait: Hun Sen, The UN, and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 24 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 51 (Fall, 2006) [attached as Tab 22].
2
Nullum crimen sine lege is the general principle of law that prohibits the prosecution or assignment of guilt for acts
not considered as crimes when committed. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to
General Assembly resolution 52/135, delivered to the General Assembly Security Council, fifty-third session Fiftyfourth year, Agenda item 110(b), at para. 60, available via the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library
[attached as Tab 38].
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to the elapsed time between the alleged crime and its prosecution.3 Both the discriminatory
intent based on political, religious, and ethical grounds, as well as the knowledge requirement for
prosecution of leaders, may be problematic in the prosecutions before the ECCC. This
memorandum addresses some of the evidentiary issues, as related to intent, which the ECCC
prosecutions are likely to face.

B.

Summary of Conclusions

i. Most of the offenses of crimes against humanity described in Article 5 of the
ECCC Statute were part of international customary law and applicable to
Cambodia in 1975.
Customary international norms in the humanitarian law realm are created through state
practice and opinio juris, often evidenced via treaties and conventions.4 Conventions, state
declarations or actions, an international tribunal, and soft law declarations occurred before 1975
that evidenced the formation of a customary international norm recognizing crimes against
humanity as a punishable offense. Furthermore, the specific offenses listed in Article 5’s
definition of crimes against humanity were also evidenced as part of customary international law
via the same conventions, state declarations, and soft law examples. Thus, as customary
international norms are binding on all states,5 Cambodia was bound by the norm establishing
crimes against humanity as a punishable offense.

3

See generally Bowman, supra note 1; Mann (Mac) Bunyanunda, Note: The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the
Defense?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2001) (discussing the loss of documents and death of many witnesses during the
25 year period since the Khmer Rouge’s leadership in Cambodia) [attached at Tab 23].
4
Theodor Schieder, Customary International Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61, 62
(Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., North-Holland 1984) [attached at Tab 34].
5
Id.
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ii. The offense of rape is questionable as a customary international norm in
1975.
While most of the specific offenses listed in Article 5 of the ECCC statute were included
as crimes against humanity under customary international law, the offense of rape was less likely
part of customary international law in 1975. Rape or sexual assault was largely unmentioned in
international law until the Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals in the 1990s.6 Although rape
and sex crimes were mentioned in a few different contexts before 1975, treatment of rape as a
crime by itself had, at best, mixed application.
iii. Crimes against humanity did not include a nexus to armed conflict under
customary international law even in 1975, and thus, the Cambodia tribunal
should conclude that a nexus to armed conflict is not part of the crimes
against humanity definition under Article 5 of the ECCC Statute.
One of the strongest arguments by the defense that is likely to come before the ECCC
Tribunal is that crimes against humanity, as a customary international crime in 1975, included a
nexus to armed conflict. Such an argument is based on the inclusion of a nexus by the
Nuremberg Tribunal and varying national laws.7 However, the Nuremberg Principles, Control
Council Law No. 10, and various soft law declarations demonstrate that even by 1975 such a
nexus to armed conflict for crimes against humanity was not applicable.8
iv. The appropriate evidentiary threshold to prove the discriminatory intent for
the crimes against humanity listed in Article 5 is that the accused knew there
6

David S. Mitchell, Article: The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens:
Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 223 (2005) [attached at Tab 29].
7
The Avalon Project, Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals
(1996), available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judcont.htm [attached at Tab 38].
8
See Michael Scharf, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights:
The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 41 (1997) [attached at Tab 33]; Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950, available at
http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-nurem.htm [attached at 5].
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was an attack directed against the civilian population on the basis of
national, political ethnical, racial, or religious grounds and that his conduct
was part of that attack.
The knowledge requirement as provided above is recognized as one of the elements of
crimes against humanity.9 Case law from the ICTY and ICTR most clearly examine the
individual knowledge element.10 However, cases from the Nuremberg Tribunal also mention the
requirement of individual knowledge.11
v. The evidentiary threshold to prove that the attacks were committed on the
basis of national, political, racial, etc. grounds requires a lesser burden than
that of the defendant’s specific intent, concerning knowledge of the attacks in
general and his individual conduct as part of that attack.
Cases from the Nuremberg Tribunals, ICTR, and the Sierra Leone Tribunal demonstrate
that a lesser burden is required to prove that attacks against civilians were committed on national,
political, or racial grounds.12 In particular, the ICTR Appellate Chamber accepted the
discriminatory intent on the basis of ethnic grounds as indisputable, approaching common
knowledge.13
vi. A wide variety of evidence is available to prove the intent behind crimes
against humanity, including witness testimony (both expert and lay witness),
9

See Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, ICTY-IT-98-29, Judgment and Opinion, December 5, 2003 (discussing the
elements of the offense of crimes against humanity) [attached at Tab 17]. The Galic Case provides that “in addition
to the intent to commit the underlying crime, the accused must know that there is an attack directed against the
civilian population and that the acts performed by him or her are part of that attack.” Galic, ICTY-IT-98-29.
10
See Galic, ICTY-IT-98-29 [attached at Tab 17]; Prosecutor v. Andre Rwamakuba, ICTR-98-44C-I, Summary of
Judgment, September 20, 2006 [attached at Tab 10]; Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, ICTR-2001-64-T,
Judgment, June 17, 2004 [attached at Tab 18].
11
See The Avalon Project, supra note 7 (discussing the use of Nazi documents to demonstrate the individual
defendant’s alleged intent) [attached at Tab 38].
12
See Patricia M. Wald, Symposium-Judgment at Nuremberg: Article: Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 6
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 621, 630 (2007) (discussing the “common knowledge” of the discriminatory intent
of various states’ policies) [attached at Tab 41].
13
See Id.
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military documents, etc. Such evidence can show the means and methods
used in the course of attack, the status of the victims, their numbers, the
discriminatory nature of the attack, the command structure of the Khmer
Rouge, etc. From these factual findings, ECCC judges can make the
necessary inferences to determine the knowledge or mens rea of the accused,
as well as the less burdensome discriminatory intent on the basis of political,
religious, etc. grounds.
Cases from various tribunals offer examples of the differing types of evidence available
to establish the requisite intents needed for the prosecution of crimes against humanity. In
particular, the ICTR, which employs the same definition as the ECCC of crimes against
humanity, 14 offers examples of evidence that can lead to the inference of the intent or disposition
of the individual defendant.15 Because of difficulties associated with the Cambodian Trials,
specifically the elapsed time between the trials and the commission of the atrocities, the ECCC
prosecution may need to be creative in the evidence that is offered to prove the requisite intents.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
From April 1975 until January 1979, the Khmer Rouge implemented a violent plan to

transform Cambodia into an agrarian, homogenous, and uniform society.16 The radical
transformation of Cambodian society required the “racial, social, ideological, and political
purification of the Cambodian nation, through the sociological and physical liquidation of a

14

See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by Security Council on November 8, 1994, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), available at http://www.ictr.org [attached at Tab 7]. Article 3 of the ICTR Statute provides
the definition of the offense of crimes against humanity.
15
See Rwamakuba, ICTR-98-44C-I (discussing the evidence necessary to convict the accused of crimes against
humanity).
16
Kathreryn M. Klein, Article: Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: The Challenges and Risks Facing the Joint
Tribunal in Cambodia, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 549, 549 (2006) [attached at Tab 25].
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variety of groups considered to be irremediably tainted by their association with the old social
order or otherwise unsuited to the intended new order.”17 During their rule, the Khmer Rouge
subjected Cambodian citizens to a purifying revolution,18 including torture, forced labor, and
forced evacuation from urban homes to the countryside.19 The Khmer Rouge instituted
systematic killing, considered necessary to implement the new society.20 Any individuals that
posed political threats were killed, including members within the Khmer Rouge ranks and the
educated.21 Certain racial and ethnic groups were annihilated as well, including the Vietnamese
minority, many of the Muslim Cham, and Buddhist monks.22 By the end of their rule in 1979,
between 1.7 and 2 million Cambodians, nearly one-fifth of the Cambodian population, were
either murdered or had died of starvation.23
Although the Khmer Rouge lost power in 1979, political, economic, and practical
reasons24 have prevented the legitimate trial of Khmer Rouge’s leaders until present.25 This
memorandum looks to address many of the issues that face the ECCC as Khmer Rouge leaders
face trial for “crimes against humanity,” as defined in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute.

Beth Van Schaak, Note: The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106
YALE L.J. 2259, 2269 (1997) [attached at Tab 32]; see also Brian D. Tittemore, Khmer Rouge Crimes: The Elusive
Search for Justice (stating that the Khmer Rouge “strove to build a socially and ethnically homogenous society by
abolishing all pre-existing economic, social, and cultural institutions, and transforming the population of Cambodia
into a collective workforce”) [attached at Tab 35].
18
Bowman, supra note 1, at 54.
19
Klein, supra note 16, at 549.
20
Talitha Gray, Note: To Keep You is no Gain, to Kill You is no Loss—Securing Justice through the International
Criminal Court, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 645, 677 (2003) [attached at Tab 24].
21
See Id. at 677.
22
Id.; see also Jason Abrams, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: The Atrocities
in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 305-306
(2001) [attached at Tab 37].
23
Gray, supra note 20, at 658; Klein, supra note 16, at 549.
24
See e.g., Bowman, supra note 1, at 55-56; Gray, supra note 20, at 680-681.
25
Cambodia did try two of the Khmer Rouge leaders in 1979 and found them guilty in absentia, but the international
community has failed to recognize the trials as legitimate. Scott Luftglass, Note: Crossroads in Cambodia: The
United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to
Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 902 (2004) (discussing the “widely regarded as a farcical trial of
both Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, the Standing Committee Member and Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs”)
[attached at Tab 27].
17
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Many conventions and treaties, state declarations and actions, international tribunal
jurisprudence, and various soft law declarations demonstrate the creation of “crimes against
humanity” as a customary international law norm by 1975. The Hague Conventions, joint state
declarations, Nuremberg Tribunals, and Geneva Conventions all demonstrate the emergence of a
customary international law norm recognizing the offense of crimes against humanity, in general,
and the specific offenses listed in Article 5, in particular. However, the specific offense of rape
under crimes against humanity was less likely recognized as part of customary international law
in 1975.26
Another issue that is evident to arise within the ECCC is whether the offense of crimes
against humanity defined in Article 5 of the ECCC statute requires a nexus to armed conflict.
Although the Nuremberg Charter limited crimes against humanity to those acts perpetrated
during times of war,27 there is evidence that crimes against humanity under customary
international law in 1975 were applicable in times of war or peace.28 This issue is very relevant
for the Cambodian tribunal, as most of the Khmer Rouge atrocities committed were not related to
any international armed conflict but were perpetrated as part of a national homogenous
unification plan against civilian Cambodians by their own government.29 However, the
Detention Orders of some ECCC defendants already include allegations or notations to link the
alleged commission of crimes against humanity to the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam
from 1975 to 1979. For example, the Provisional Detention Order of Khieu Samphan notes “that
there was a state of international armed conflict between Democratic Kampuchea and the

26

See Mitchell, supra note 6 (discussing rape as a preemptory norm of jus cogens under current international law
while most sources provided as evidence occurred after 1980).
27
See The Avalon Project, supra note 7 (discussing the Nuremberg Charter’s requirement that the offense of crimes
against humanity be related to an armed conflict).
28
See Scharf, supra note 8; see also Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 8.
29
See Klein, supra note 16; Van Schaak, supra note 17 (characterizing the Khmer Rouge national policy).
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Socialist Republic of Vietnam during all or part of the period between 17 April 1975 and 6
January 1979.”30 The detention order in this ECCC case illustrates the concern around whether
the offense of crimes against humanity requires a nexus to armed conflict.
Two intent or mens rea requirements emerge from the chapeau of Article 5 for crimes
against humanity. The first is the discriminatory intent on racial, political, or ethnic grounds.
The evidentiary threshold needed to prove discriminatory intent requires a less stringent
standard, especially as a discriminatory, governmental policy becomes well-known and proven.31
For example, the Nuremberg Tribunals quickly deciphered the state policy of persecution against
the Jews and accepted such policy as evidence in all cases of the discriminatory intent against
Jews.32 Furthermore, the Rwandan Appellate Chamber found that the discriminatory intent on
ethnic grounds was not disputable, as a state policy to attack Tutsi civilians was evident.33 Thus,
although the prosecutors in the Cambodia Tribunal must initially demonstrate a discriminatory
intent on political, religious, and ethnic grounds, it is possible that the discriminatory intent,
especially on political grounds, will become accepted knowledge by the court.
The second mens rea element of the Article 5 chapeau is the individual’s knowledge of
the wider context of an attack against civilians and knowledge that his conduct is part of that
attack. Although the individual knowledge requirement was first alluded to in the Nuremberg
Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR cases discuss this knowledge requirement in more detail.34 The
Nuremberg and ICTR cases also provide diverse examples of the types of evidence that allow

30

Provisional Detention Order of Khieu Samphan, Criminal Case No: 002/14-08-2006, Investigation No.: 002/1909-2007-ECCC/OCIJ.
31
See Abrams, supra note 22.
32
The Avalon Project, supra note 7.
33
Prosecutor v. Andre Rwamakuba, ICTR-98-44C-I, Summary of Judgment, September 20, 2006 (discussing
appellate decision to stipulate that the discriminatory intent of attacks against Tutsi in Rwanda were “notorious facts
not subject to reasonable dispute”) [attached at Tab 10].
34
The case in the ICTY of Stanislav Galic spoke in depth about this requirement. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic,
ICTY-IT-98-29, Judgment and Opinion, December 5, 2003 [attached at Tab 17].
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judges to infer the intent of a specific defendant. Equipped with examples from the Nuremberg
tribunals, the ICTY, and the ICTR, ECCC prosecutors must be creative in the introduction of
evidence to ECCC judges to show the requisite knowledge of the individual defendants. The
elapsed time between prosecution and the atrocities, as well as the cloak of secrecy around the
Khmer Rouge leadership, 35 create great obstacles for the Cambodian prosecutors to prove the
knowledge of individual defendants. However, evidence to demonstrate the requisite level of
knowledge by the defendants is possible in the Cambodian context, especially given the large
number of documents kept by the Khmer Rouge in specific instances, such as documents from
the Tuol Sleng prison.36

III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A.

Crimes Against Humanity in Customary International Law

i. Customary International Law
Three basic sources of international law exist: treaties, custom, and general principals of
law.37 International treaties bind all parties to the provision of the treaty.38 Treaties can also be
of a “fundamentally norm-creating character” and, if a rule of custom ensues, can generate rights
and duties for third parties who did not sign the treaty itself.39 General principles of international
law are basic, fundamental rules recognized by the international community.40 General

35
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principles often parallel systems of domestic law.41 Furthermore, they are the lowest source in
the hierarchy of sources, serving where neither treaty nor customary international law applies.42
Customary law demonstrates a customary rule within the international community,
binding all states to it.43 The international order has a horizontal structure in that sovereign states
create the international law and bind themselves to it.44 As for the relationship between the
different sources of international law, treaties take precedence between the parties to the treaty
over customary law, while customary law prevails over general principles of law.45 This
hierarchical order between different sources of international law is not strict, as the varying
sources are often used to complement or supplement each other.46 Often the varying sources of
international law are used to express a customary norm; such provisions of a treaty can be
expressions of a customary norm.47 Furthermore, the use of treaties to create or express
international law has increased, decreasing the need to identify the creation of customary norms
in many respects.48 Treaties often confirm the illegality of actions under customary norms,
provide a forum for governments to make public statements in support of a particular norm, or
outline implementation procedures for a particular norm.49 Thus, the distinction between treaty
and customary law in the area of humanitarian law has substantially decreased.50
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The elements of customary law are state practice and opinio juris, or the conviction that
the practice reflects binding legal obligation.51 Thus, states act or practice the behavior because
they understand such behavior to be legally obligated.52 In examining state practice, the most
conclusive evidence of state practice is positive acts by states within the international system,53
as state practice requires the state to consent to the rule by engaging in “constant and uniform”
behavior.54 However, “customary law does not need clear and unequivocal support by all
States…; strong opposition, on the other hand, excludes the formation of new law.”55
Furthermore, although traditionally state practice has reflected an international norm, state
practice is currently designed to create the norm.56 In the human rights context, many scholars
refer to the “paper practice” or words of states, as opposed to deeds of states, to evidence state
practice in the creation of a customary international norm.57 Evidence of state practice in the
human rights context includes the incorporation of human rights provisions in domestic law,
international organization resolutions, and statements by national leaders.58 Opinio juris requires
the states to act out of a sense of legal obligation.59 The legal convictions or pronouncements of
state organs, and not the population at large, are necessary.60 Furthermore, violation of the
customary norm does not mean that the norm no longer exists, as disappearance or replacement
of a customary norm requires international acceptance.61 Thus, once a customary international
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norm is formed, it is difficult to get rid of it and states, not in a treaty that expresses otherwise,
are bound by it.

ii. Crimes Against Humanity
“Crimes against humanity,” as a general concept, was part of customary international
law in 1975 and thus, binding on Cambodia, precluding treaty obligations to the contrary.
Furthermore, with the exception of rape, the offenses listed within Article 5 of the ECCC in
defining “crimes against humanity” were recognized offenses of crimes against humanity in
1975, again binding Cambodia. By 1945, with the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunals,
accompanied by the Nuremberg Principles, “crimes against humanity” in general were part of
customary international law.62 The inclusion of specific offenses within the Nuremberg
Charter’s definition of crimes against humanity left only imprisonment, torture, and rape as
offenses listed in Article 5’s definition outside of codified customary international law.63
However, both imprisonment and torture were part of customary international law by 1975,
leaving rape as the only questionable customary international norm at that time.
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, or the general principle of law that prohibits the
prosecution or assignment of guilt for acts not considered crimes when committed, requires that
any crimes listed in the ECCC statute were crimes under international law and domestic law in
1975, the year that the Khmer Rouge began its campaign against the people in Cambodia.64
Article 5 of the ECCC Statute lists nine offenses that constitute crimes against humanity. Those
62
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offenses are: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape;
persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; and other inhuman acts.65 Thus, to
establish whether the varying enumerated offenses in Article 5 of the ECCC Statute were part of
customary international law in 1975, and thus, binding on Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge
leaders, state practice and opinio juris must be examined from the standpoint of 1975.
State practice and opinio juris concerning crimes against humanity, and thus, customary
international law, can be discerned from the various conventions, state declarations, international
tribunals, and soft law documents or declarations by international organizations, as evidence of
states’ intention to create a customary international norm.66 Before 1975 many conventions,
including the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and the Genocide Convention, had
occurred, demonstrating both state practice and opinio juris toward the recognition of a
customary international norm denouncing crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the
Nuremberg Tribunals suggest strong support and the establishment of opinio juris for the
recognition of a customary international norm denouncing crimes against humanity.
a. The Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907
The concept of crimes against humanity originated with the concept of “crimes against
the laws of humanity,” a phrase found in the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Conventions.67
Although the Hague Conventions dealt mainly with crimes of war, many of the convention
provisions required the humanitarian treatment of prisoners or the targeting of only military
objectives or personnel.68 Thus, the Conventions evidenced an emerging norm against murder,
extermination, and torture.
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b. Joint Declaration in 1915 of France, Great Britain, and Russia
State practice demonstrating a customary international norm regarding crimes against
humanity is also evidenced by various declarations of state governments. The term “crimes
against humanity” originated as a category of international crimes in the joint declaration of the
governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia in 1915.69 The joint declaration denounced as
“crimes against civilization and humanity” the Turkish massacre of more than a million
Armenians in Turkey and declared that those responsible would be criminally liable.70 Thus,
even in 1915, states were acting affirmatively to condemn the offense of crimes against
humanity, supporting the creation of a customary international norm denouncing crimes against
humanity and calling for prosecution of those responsible.
c. The Nuremberg Tribunals in 1945
Crimes against humanity were first codified as criminal offenses in the Charter of the
Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.71 Although the Charter initially represented an advance over
existing international law at the time of adoption,72 the Nuremberg Charter based the inclusion of
crimes against humanity on the Hague Conventions, practices and experiences in the aftermath
of World War I, and the Allied declarations during World War II, calling the Charter an
expression of international law that existed at the time of its creation.73 The International Law
Commission of the United Nations (ILC), under the direction of the General Assembly to
“formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal” 74 took the expression of international law further
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by declaring that “crimes against humanity” are “punishable as crimes under international
law.”75
The Nuremberg Tribunals defined crimes against humanity as:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal [i.e. war crimes or crimes against peace], whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.76
The Nuremberg Tribunal definition of crimes against humanity, accompanied by the Nuremberg
Principles, demonstrate that the international community in 1945 already recognized “crimes
against humanity” as an offense that was contrary to customary international law.77 Because the
specific offenses of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts,
as well as persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, were defended as crimes under
customary international law in 1945,78 the inclusion of these offenses within the definition of
crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the ECCC statute is accurate, as they were part of
customary international law in 1975. Thus, after the Nuremberg Tribunals with the inclusion of
the Nuremberg Principles, which made “crimes against humanity” and the specific offenses of
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, other inhumane acts, and persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds crimes under customary international law,79 only the
remaining Article 5 offenses of imprisonment, torture, and rape are left outside of customary
international law in 1950.
75
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d. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948
Although the United Nation’s General Assembly resolutions are not binding as soft law,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was a significant international declaration
and thus, lends support to the establishment of a customary international norm denouncing
various offenses within crimes against humanity. Because the UN General Assembly represents
the community of states, UN General Assembly Resolutions demonstrate state opinion about
international law.80 Furthermore, in 1948, when it was originally adopted, forty-eight of the
UN’s fifty-six members voted in its favor,81 evidencing strong state support for the principles
included within the declaration. Article 2 of the UDHR entitles all to rights and freedoms
“without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,”82 lending support to the
customary norm against persecutions on various grounds. Article 4 relates specifically to the
denunciation of slavery or servitude,83 complementing the already established customary norm
against enslavement. Article 5 provides additional weight to the creation of a customary
international norm against torture.84 The offense of imprisonment under international customary
law is supported by Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that “no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”85 Thus, the UDHR provides
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additional weight for the emergency of a customary international norm against crimes against
humanity and the specific offenses of persecution, enslavement, torture, and imprisonment.
e. The 1948 Geneva Conventions
The four Geneva Conventions codified the international rules concerning the treatment of
prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory.86 Each of the Conventions enumerates
specific “grave breaches” or war crimes under international law for which criminal liability
exists for anyone who commits such acts.87 The relevant “grave breaches” under the Geneva
Conventions include: willful killings, torture, or inhumane treatment, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer and unlawful
confinement of a civilian.88
Because the Geneva Conventions are one of the most widely ratified treaties of the
world,89 it is evident that many States acted to create the legal obligation not to perpetrate such
grave breaches. The obligation not to perpetrate the specific grave breaches of willful killings,
torture, etc. are important, as they directly correlate with the offenses of “crimes against
humanity” in Article 5 of the ECCC. Although the enumerated crimes of murder, extermination,
and other inhumane acts were already a part of customary international law, the offenses in
Article 5 of imprisonment and torture are either directly mentioned or implied within the 1949
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Geneva Conventions.90 The Geneva Conventions’ inclusion of imprisonment and torture further
develop the elements of these offenses under customary international law via state practice and
opinio juris.
f. The Genocide Convention of 1950
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
provided an absolute obligation for treaty parties to prosecute people responsible for the
perpetration of genocide.91 The Genocide Convention defined genocide as any of the following
acts when committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious groups, as such”:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.92
Although limited in its application by the requirement of intent to destroy a target group and the
exclusion of “political groups” as a target group,93 the Genocide Convention again adds weight
to state practice and opinio juris at the time of a customary international norm against the
perpetration of specific acts of violence against civilians. Specifically the offenses of murder,
extermination, persecutions on racial and religious grounds (political grounds are not included),
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and other inhumane acts in Article 5’s definition of crimes against humanity are supported as
part of customary international law by the Genocide Convention.94
g. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides evidence
of a developing customary international norm recognizing various offenses of crimes against
humanity before 1975. The ICCPR was originally drafted in 1966.95 Countries that signed the
Covenant defended the fundamental right to life, irrespective of “race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”96
State parties also declared that no person can be tortured, enslaved, arbitrarily imprisoned, or
made to do forced labor.97 In addition to supplementing the established international customary
law norm against several offenses already recognized under Nuremberg, the ICCPR shows
continuing state support and practice, along with opinio juris, toward a customary international
law norm against imprisonment and torture which are also listed in Article 5 of the ECCC
statute, as offenses under crimes against humanity.
h. The 1975 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Finally, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1975 demonstrated a
customary international law norm, recognizing torture as a prosecutable crime in international
It is important to note that the omission of “political groups” from the Genocide Convention has potentially
serious consequences for the prosecutors at the ECCC. Due to the omission of “political groups” from the definition
of genocide, the killing of approximately one million people in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge may go
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law. The broad definition of torture forced States to include a large number of crimes under law
as torture.98 Although soft law, the Torture Convention was adopted by consensus of the
General Assembly, evidencing the emergence of an international customary law norm against the
commission of torture.99 Thus, a survey of state practice and opinio juris before 1975
demonstrates that crimes against humanity were recognized as part of customary international
law.
Even if an argument was made that the offenses of crimes against humanity listed in
Article 5 were not part of customary international law in 1975, many offenses and crimes
committed by the Khmer Rouge could still be prosecuted under Cambodian treaty and domestic
law applicable in 1975. Cambodia may be held to some of the offenses as part of treaty law, as
Cambodia, even under Khmer Rouge rule, were party to many conventions before 1975. For
example, Cambodia ratified all four of the Geneva conventions on December 8, 1958, thus,
binding itself to the principles within.100 Also, Cambodia was a party to the Genocide
Convention without reservation since 1951 when the treaty was first entered into force, and the
Khmer Rouge never denounced the Convention.101 Cambodia had signed the 1930 Convention
on Forced Labour, which criminalized forced labor.102 Furthermore, Cambodian national law
also provided support to the prosecution of some of the specific offenses mentioned in Article
5’s definition of crimes against humanity. The pre-1975 Cambodian criminal law, specifically
the 1956 Penal Code, represents the primary domestic law under which the Khmer Rouge would
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be subject in 1975.103 The most relevant crimes under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code include:
homicide, torture, rape,104 other physical assaults, arbitrary arrest or detention, attacks on
religion, and other abuses of governmental authority.105 Therefore, even if it was held that some
of the offenses of crimes against humanity in Article 5 were not part of customary international
law in 1975, ECCC prosecutors may still prosecute similar offenses under Cambodian law from
1975, whether via Cambodian treaty law or domestic law from the 1956 Penal Code.

iii. Rape as a Crime Against Humanity Offense
While much evidence exists to demonstrate that the offenses listed as crimes against
humanity in Article 5 of the ECCC statute were part of customary international law in 1975, the
offense of rape as a customary international norm is less evident. Rape and other crimes of
sexual violence have historically received little attention in international law.106 The Lieber
Instructions of 1863, which codified laws of land warfare during the United States Civil War,
specified rape as a capital crime.107 However, the 1907 Hague Conventions departed from the
Lieber Instructions and did not expressly prohibit rape.108 The Convention instead only requires
that “family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property… must be
respected.”109 The Nuremberg Charter did not mention rape or sexual assault and thus, no one
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was prosecuted for such crimes in the trials.110 Similarly, the Tokyo Charter that prosecuted
those in Japan for crimes committed during World War II did not mention rape.111 However,
defendants were prosecuted for rape crimes, but they were ancillary to those for other war
crimes.112 The Control Council Law No. 10 listed rape as a crime against humanity,113 but no
individual was ever prosecuted for rape crimes.114 The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits rape
in Article 27, but fails to mention rape or sexual assault under “grave breaches.”115 Furthermore,
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights imply the prohibition of rape under “inhuman or degrading treatment,” but
neither expressly prohibits rape.116
After examination of the various Conventions and legal prosecutions by the international
community, it is evident that customary international law regarding a prohibition against rape
was questionable in 1975. Although some conventions and state practice did denounce rape as a
crime, its denouncement was subtle or lacked the specific language or practice to make it a
customary international law norm. This is most evident with the prosecution of rape in the
Tokyo trials via other war crimes, or the UDHR or ICCPR’s lack of the specific language
prohibiting rape and sexual violence.117 Due to the varying applications and language of the
conventions and declarations, suggesting a lack of state practices and opinio juris, rape had not
defiantly emerged as a customary international norm by the time the Khmer Rouge began its
campaign against the citizens of Cambodia. Thus, the offense of rape within Article 5 of the
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ECCC statute was not likely part of customary international law in 1975, and is ripe for appeal
by ECCC defendants.

iv. Crimes against humanity and the nexus to armed conflict
One issue that has already arisen concerning the Khmer Rouge leaders’ criminal liability
for “crimes against humanity” in the ECCC is whether crimes against humanity must be linked
to an armed conflict.118 The definition of crimes against humanity under the Nuremberg Charter
left open the question of whether crimes against humanity had to be linked to war to be required
by international law or merely by the Nuremberg Charter.119 The ECCC must address this issue,
as defendants will argue that none of the alleged atrocities were committed during an armed
conflict, but during political consolidation after a civil war,120 and thus, they are not guilty of
committing “crimes against humanity.” The adoption of either a broader or narrower view of the
nexus to armed conflict could determine whether many of the actions of the Khmer Rouge
constitute crimes against humanity and furthermore, provides precedent on the nexus issue in
international law.121
Many developments between 1945 and 1975 evidence that crimes against humanity
under customary international law extended to atrocities committed during peacetime. The
Control Council Law No. 10122 did not include a linkage to war in its definition of crimes against
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humanity.123 Also, the United Nations War Crimes Commission, in its 1948 authoritative report,
concluded that individuals could be liable for crimes against humanity committed both during
war and peacetime under international law.124 The Nuremberg Principles suggested that crimes
against humanity in general did not require a nexus to war, but retained the limitation for crimes
against humanity persecutions.125 The Genocide Convention in 1948 also dropped any nexus
with war for genocide.126 In 1968, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity implied that crimes against humanity
were not limited by a nexus to war.127 Although the ICTY requires a nexus to armed conflict, the
definition of crimes against humanity in both the ICTR and ICC does not require a link to armed
conflict.128 Thus, a strong argument exists to demonstrate that a nexus to armed conflict was not
part of customary international law in relation to crimes against humanity in 1975.

B. The Evidentiary Threshold of Discriminatory Intent in Crimes Against
Humanity
The chapeau of Article 5 of the ECCC Statute creates elements of discriminatory intent in
establishing the commission of crimes against humanity. Article 5 reads in its entirety:
Crimes against humanity, which have no statute of limitations, are any
acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population, on national, political, ethnical, racial, or
religious grounds, such as:
--murder;
--extermination;
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--enslavement;
--deportation;
--imprisonment;
--torture;
--rape;
--persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds;
--other inhuman acts.129
Thus, the chapeau of Article 5 creates two potential mens rea elements. The first is with respect
to the planned attack occurring against civilians on the basis of the victim’s nationality, politics,
ethnicity, race, or religion. The second is the requisite knowledge of the wider context that there
is an attack directed against any civilian population and that his conduct is part of the attack on
the civilian population.130
The chapeau of Article 5 makes crimes against humanity determinative of a state policy
or action.131 Most of the specific crimes listed within the definition of crimes against humanity
under Article 5 of the ECCC statute can occur only as a result of state action or policy carried out
by state or non-state actors, i.e. extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, and
persecution.132 Furthermore, the policy or plan is directed against a group based on specific
characteristics of the group or individuals targeted on a “widespread or systematic” basis. Due to
the element of state action or policy within the definition of crimes against humanity, it follows
that, if a state has developed and attempted to carry out a policy or engaged in acts whose
outcomes include crimes against humanity offenses, then those within the government that
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created or intended to carry out the policy could be charged with crimes against humanity or with
complicity to commit crimes against humanity.133 This policy element “is the jurisdictional
element that makes ‘crimes against humanity’ a category of international crimes that
distinguishes it from other forms of mass victimization which otherwise are within national
criminal jurisdiction.”134
Evidence of all kinds is necessary to establish any of the allegations against the ECCC
defendants. In the Nuremberg Tribunals, the prosecutions against the defendants rested in large
measure on Nazi Regime documents of their own making, as several thousands of documents
were tendered for evidence.135 However, thirty-three witnesses gave evidence for the
Prosecution, sixty-one witnesses, in addition to nineteen of the individual defendants, gave
evidence for the Defense, and thirty-eight thousand affidavits were submitted.136 The Tokyo
Tribunals relied heavily on witness testimony and secondary sources of documentation due to a
lack of primary documentation.137 Both the ICTY and ICTR have relied on both eye-witness and
documentary evidence to make the case against the accused.138 The ICTY, in a case against
Stanislav Galic, heard 120 witnesses for the prosecution and 51 for the defense, while receiving
over 600 exhibits from each the prosecution and defense before sentencing him to life in
prison.139 In another case, the ICTY heard over 60 witnesses and reviewed close to 1,000
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exhibits before sentencing Milan Martic to 35 years in prison.140 In addition, the ICTR has relied
heavily on propaganda, including radio addresses endorsing the killing of various ethnic
groups.141 Thus, just as different tribunals have used varying methods of evidence, the ECCC
must use a wide variety of evidence to prove the specific mens rea of the individual defendants
charged with the offense of crimes against humanity.

i. Planned attack against civilians on national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds
The discriminatory intent standard outlined in Article 5 of the ECCC statute is much less
than the “intent” needed to establish genocide.142 While genocide requires the intent to destroy
in whole or in part an enumerated group, crimes against humanity merely require that the state
policy or attack against civilians be on a basis of racial, religious, political, etc. grounds.143 The
definition of crimes against humanity also includes a broader protected group and range of acts
that qualify for prosecution than genocide.144
Evidence of the discriminatory basis is proven by examination of the status of victims
and their numbers, as well as by examining the state policy or plan itself along with official
statements or records, or the words and actions of those committing the atrocities via witness
testimony. Hate speech was ruled to show discriminatory intent in a media case at the ICTR.145
The existence of a state plan or policy has also been used to demonstrate the discriminatory
intent on the basis of ethnical and religious grounds during the Nuremberg Tribunals.146
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As official pronouncements of intent to carry out a policy against civilians are not always
available or link all potential perpetrators, circumstantial evidence, such as the scale of the
atrocities or the status of the victims, are needed to show the requisite intent.147 In the
Nuremberg trials, the Nazi Party had formulated and documented a policy of persecution against
Jews. The anti-Jewish policy was outlined in Point 4 of the Party Programme, which declared
that only those of German blood were members of the race and thus, citizens, while “no Jew can
be a member of the race.”148 The programme limited the political and social rights of the Jews in
Germany.149 Speeches and public declarations of the Nazi leaders, as well as publications,
portrayed Jews in a negative light or ridiculed them.150 Also, throughout the Nazi leadership,
discriminatory laws or restrictions were placed against the Jews.151 The creation of pogroms and
ghettos, as well as an order of the Security Policy which required Jews to wear a yellow star,
added further evidence to the policy or plan directed against Jews.152 The “final solution” of the
Jews was made evident via original reports and Nazi declarations. Furthermore, testimony from
officials within the Nazi party demonstrated the state policy of discrimination and extermination
of Jews.153 The Nuremberg Tribunal heard evidence from Hoess, the Commandant of Auschwitz
from 1940 to 1943, that the camp saw the extermination of 2,500,000 people, with another
500,000 dying from disease and starvation.154 The Nazi documents, speeches, and witness
testimony of Nazi officials and victims demonstrated the discriminatory intent or persecution of
the Jews by evidencing a state policy directed against them.
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Rwandan Tribunal trials also provide examples of the different types of evidence that is
used to demonstrate the discriminatory intent on the basis of national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds. The Rwandan Tribunal employs the same definition of crimes against
humanity as the ECCC,155 and thus, can demonstrate how to prove the specific crimes with the
requisite discriminatory intent, as they are described in either Article 3 of the ICTY statute or
Article 5 of the ECCC statute. In regards to the discriminatory intent in Rwanda, the Appellate
Chamber held “that genocide against Tutsi and widespread or systematic attacks against a
civilian population based on Tutsi ethnic identification occurred in Rwanda…are notorious facts
not subject to reasonable dispute.”156 Therefore, the discriminatory intent on ethnic, racial,
political, etc. grounds is often common knowledge or accepted as undisputable.

ii. Knowledge of the policy or plan and that conduct is part of the planned attack on civilians
The state policy element of crimes against humanity under the chapeau of Article 5 of the
ECCC Statute extends one step further, as it requires that the government official facing charges
of crimes against humanity have knowledge of the policy or plan and knowledge that his conduct
is part of the policy or plan. Since government officials or leaders can be held responsible for
the state policy, it is necessary to show that they had knowledge of the policy and took actions in
either implementing the policy or allowing the policy to progress.
Although the perpetrator must be shown to have knowledge of the wider context of the
attack and that his own acts are part of the widespread or systematic attack, he need not have the
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same intent as the actual participants in the attacks.157 Furthermore, the existence of a state
policy, as part of a widespread and systematic attack, is often stipulated, proven by “expert”
evidence, or referenced by testimony.158 A recent Appellate Court decision regarding the
atrocities in Rwanda found that the existence of a widespread and systematic was a “notorious
fact not subject to reasonable debate.”159 In situations like the Balkans and Sierra Leone, where
an ongoing conflict is almost always accompanied by a pattern of civilian abuse, the widespread
and systematic attack on civilians qualifies as “common knowledge.”160 Thus, the leadership
position of varying defendants is potential evidence of knowledge. For example, Goering was
prosecuted and found guilty of all crimes in the Nuremberg Tribunals. As Commander-in Chief
of the Luftwaffe, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and his tremendous influence with
Hitler, Goering was the most prominent man in the Nazi Regime after Hitler.161 Goering’s own
admissions that Hitler kept him informed of all military and political problems, as well as
documents written by him in his position of Plenipotentiary or anti-Jewish decrees signed by
him, were sufficient to prove his position in the Nazi Regime, and his knowledge of the policies
or plans to use foreign civilians in slave labor and persecutions of the Jews.162
Leadership positions are also relevant in demonstrating knowledge, even when the leader
exercised little direct authority over policy or police matters, as complaints are often registered
with party leaders. M. De Vabras, or “Frick,” was the chief Nazi administrative specialist and
bureaucrat, appointed Reichminister of the Interior in Hitler’s cabinet.163 Although control of
concentration camps and execution of orders for protective custody fell under jurisdiction of the
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Reichminister, Frick argued that since he exercised little direct control over police matters that
he had no knowledge of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps.164 However, he
received complaints from various lower level Nazis about the atrocities in the camp. Thus, the
Tribunal concluded, based on the complaints and witness testimony, that he knew of the
atrocities committed and continued to sign decrees authorizing “special measures” to continue.165
The ICTY also presents examples of how leadership positions demonstrate the
knowledge of the individual defendant. In determining that Stanislav Galic had knowledge of
the plan to attack civilians during the siege on Sarajevo and his actions as part of the attack, the
court heard evidence that demonstrated that Galic, as commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija
Corps (SRK), not only had control of the troops below him, but that he had control over the pace
and scale of the attacks themselves.166 Testimony and documentary evidence showed that Galic
had received complaints about the attacks on civilians from his troops, and he had the ability to
punish those who went against his orders or violated military discipline.167 However, Galic very
rarely, if ever, disciplined any of his troops for violations.168 Thus, his position of commander
and decisions not to address complaints of civilian attacks helped demonstrate his guilt.
Furthermore, witness testimony pointed to a reduction in the frequency of attacks after pressure
was put on Galic to have them stopped,169 and that an increase in shelling and sniping occurred
when demands from the Serb military authorities were not met.170 Therefore, not only did Galic
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have control via his position, his decisions to continue the attacks were evident and portray his
knowledge of his own actions in the plan to attack civilians.
The Rwanda Tribunal also regarded political activities or a leadership position as relevant
in determining guilt. In the case of Andre Rwamakuba, the Tribunal stated that any factual
allegations related to political activities or role as a member of ruling party or as Minister of the
Interim Government provided context or background from which to infer the defendant’s intent
or disposition.171 However, despite the ease with which the discriminatory intent on ethnic
grounds was established, the Tribunal found that the Prosecution failed to prove the allegations
against the defendant, as hearsay evidence and inconsistent witness testimony discredited the
prosecution’s case.172
In another Rwandan Tribunal case against Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, the defendant was found
guilty of crimes against humanity for extermination and rape.173 In the case against the
defendant for extermination of Tutsis, the Chamber heard much witness testimony to determine
that the accused knew of the widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population as he
planned and led certain operations.174 The Chambers reached this legal conclusion as witness
testimony demonstrated that the defendant had participated in preparatory meetings with local
officials to launch an attack against the Tutsi, incited local officials to single out and kill Tutsi,
delivered and distributed boxes of weapons in different locations, and accompanied the
communal police and drove around in communal vehicles to ensure that his instructions were
followed.175
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In regards to the rape conviction of Gacumbitsi, for similar reasons as stated in the above
paragraph, the Chamber found that the defendant knew of the widespread and systematic attack
against the Tutsi civilian population. Furthermore, the Chamber found that the chose of victims
based on their Tutsi ethnic origin or relationship with a person of Tutsi ethnic origin
demonstrated the discriminatory intent on ethnic grounds.176 Also, utterances by the defendant
that sticks should be stuck into the Tutsi women’s and girls’ genitals if they resisted, as
recounted by eyewitness testimony, demonstrated the defendant’s instigation of the rape of Tutsi
women and girls since immediately after he made such utterances to instigate the rapes, eight
Tutsi women and girls were raped by men within earshot of the defendant’s instigation.177
It is important to note that the Chamber found that the defendant’s governmental position
did not, per se, place him in a position of superiority over all other officials in the area.178
However, he was found to have the specific responsibility for the maintenance of law and order
in the region.179 These factual findings are important, as they demonstrate that the Rwandan
Tribunal still required specific knowledge of the individual defendant despite a top governmental
leadership position. Such a position can only be used as a contextual or background fact to infer
intent or disposition of an individual. However, in another ICTR case, the court did note that the
defendant’s position as Minister of Government lent considerable authority to his words or
incitements to violence. 180 Thus, his incitements to kill or rape Tutsis were potentially heeded
with greater strength because of his high leadership position. Therefore, although a
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governmental leadership position provides background or context to infer knowledge, a high
level position is not per se evidence of an individual defendant’s guilt.

iii. Evidentiary Threshold for Discriminatory Intent and Knowledge in Cambodia
Many of the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge against the Cambodian population
are crimes against humanity under the Article 5 ECCC statute definition. The question remains
as to how, or if, the prosecution can prove the criminal liability of the individuals charged within
the Cambodian context.
The Group of Experts, a three-member group, was sent to Cambodia in 1999 on a fact
finding mission by the UN.181 The group was asked to evaluate existing evidence to determine
the nature of crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, assess feasibility of apprehending and
detaining Khmer Rouge leaders, and to determine the options for trying Khmer Rouge leaders
before an international or national tribunal.182 The Group of Experts determined that the Khmer
Rouge leaders had committed crimes under international and Cambodian law, including crimes
against humanity.183
Luckily for the prosecution in the ECCC, the Khmer Rouge, like the Nazis, kept
meticulous records.184 The Documentation Center of Cambodia has collected in excess of
600,000 pages of Khmer Rouge documents.185 These documents are vital to the prosecution of
those charged with crimes against humanity before the ECCC.
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Although it must initially be proven in the ECCC Tribunal, the discriminatory intent of
the Khmer Rouge leaders in an attack on the civilian population on political grounds may
become undisputed. Due to the extensive evidence of a state policy of attack on political
grounds, its acceptance is likely to become common knowledge or at least more accepted, like
the intent on ethnic grounds in Rwanda. However, the discriminatory intent on ethnic or
religious grounds is likely to continue to prove more difficult and less accepted.
Proving the discriminatory intent of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians on
national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds is possible in the context of Cambodia. In
implementing the “Year Zero” policy, the discriminatory intent on the basis of political grounds
is evident. Anyone that posed a possible threat to the goal of creating a new society was killed,
even members of its own ranks.186 Tuol Sleng, or S-21 as it was also known, was a school
turned prison and interrogation center and acted as one of the central torture and extermination
centers for the Khmer Rouge.187 Documents obtained from Tuol Sleng show that all entering
“prisoners” were numbered, photographed, and forced to sign confessions before being killed.188
The confessions signed by prisoners show they were targeted for political reasons.189
Interrogation manuals instructing guards on the use of torture were also found at Tuol Sleng.190
Between 16,000 and 20,000 prisoners were interrogated and executed at Tuol Sleng.191
Furthermore, the documents portray a state policy of widespread and systematic attack against
civilians. Not only were political enemies of the state brought to the prison, but Tuol Sleng’s
large size and location in the capital city demonstrate the central government’s creation and
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knowledge of the political prison.192 Thus, the documents found at Tuol Sleng present a
compelling case of crimes against humanity based on political grounds by the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia.
Further evidence of state action and knowledge of the actions taking place at Tuol Sleng
by the various Khmer Rouge leadership is evident with the subsequent admissions of certain
Khmer Rouge leaders. Statements by Kang Kek Ieu, alias Duch, link the highest members of the
Khmer Rouge to the political killings at Tuol Sleng.193 Duch served as the chief of the national
security apparatus during the Khmer Rouge rule and was the on-site supervisor at Tuol Sleng.194
While hiding in Cambodian jungles after the demise of the Khmer Rouge, a western journalist
interviewed Duch about the role of top Khmer Rouge leaders and their knowledge of the acts at
Tuol Sleng.195 Duch’s testimony clarifies the role of key figures in ordering the interrogations,
torture, and executions at Tuol Sleng. He identified three individuals responsible for the orders:
Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Ta Mok, and said that Khieu Samphan knew of the killings.196 Duch
further said that Ieng Sary knew little of the internal workings of Cambodia because he worked
outside of Cambodia, as the foreign minister.197 After his interview, Duch was arrested among
U.N. fears for his safety. Thus, he is available to testify in upcoming trials against the Khmer
Rouge leaders and their roles in the acts at Tuol Sleng. Of course his credibility and motives are
likely to be called into question because of his role at Tuol Sleng.198 However, witnesses,
including Duch, in combination with Khmer Rouge documents, are likely to provide the
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evidence necessary to demonstrate a state policy of attacks against civilians on political grounds
and specific individuals’ knowledge of the policy.
Evidence to demonstrate discriminatory intent on the basis of ethnic or religious grounds
also exists, although arguably to a lesser extent. The policy of the Khmer Rouge to create a
purely Khmer nation at “Year Zero” is evident. Khmer Rouge decrees “banning” all minorities,
or requiring the extermination or forced assimilation of all non-Khmer ethnic groups199 begins to
demonstrate the existence of a state policy with a discriminatory intent on the basis of ethnicity
and religion. Although evidence to establish a genocidal intent to destroy in whole or in part
various ethnic and religious groups is difficult in the Cambodian context, the lesser intent
required by crimes against humanity makes it more likely. The Khmer Rouge had the goal of
exterminating any group that was inconsistent with their vision for a pure Khmer nation.200 The
Muslim Chams, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Thai communities faced ethnical discrimination,
forced assimilation, and death.201 As part of Khmer Rouge’s effort to eliminate the influence of
religion, the Khmer Rouge drove Buddhist priests and monks from their religious practice and
into the working fields, killing any who resisted.202 Public statements, efforts to destroy the
distinctive traits of the various ethnic and religious groups, and the number of dead from those
groups provide evidence of the intent to commit crimes against humanity on ethnic and religious
grounds.203
The knowledge requirement in the Cambodia context may be more difficult to prove than
the discriminatory intent on political, ethnic, or religious grounds. One reason for the difficulty
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is that a fundamental principles underlying Pol Pot’s regime was secrecy.204 The Khmer Rouge
leadership, or the Standing Committee, evidenced distrust for outsiders and did not issue official
orders.205 Even the identities of the Standing Committee or Khmer Rouge leaders were cloaked
in secrecy.206 However, over the years, the Khmer Rouge leadership structure has been pieced
together, identifying the leading officials and their positions and responsibilities.207 Furthermore,
a report from the War Crimes Research Office (WCRO) at American University has concluded
that archival documents from Cambodia demonstrate the knowledge of former Khmer Rouge
leaders, despite their public statements of ignorance to the remote site political killings in
Cambodia.208
Cambodia also faces difficulties unique to its situation. Because the atrocities took place
over 25 years ago, many of the responsible parties and witnesses are dead.209 Furthermore,
memories of the surviving witnesses have faded over the years, decreasing credibility of witness
testimony.210 Finding credible witnesses to establish the links of causation and intent or
knowledge by the Khmer Rouge leaders may be difficult, as many of those still alive with
incriminating evidence may themselves by prosecutable for crimes, reducing their likelihood to
come forward.211 Also, many documents have been either destroyed or lost over the years.212
Thus, the ECCC prosecutors must be creative in presenting evidence to the tribunal. Evidence of
a plan, policy or campaign against civilians on political, religious, or ethnical grounds can be
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shown by examining the frequency, intensity, and geographical spread of attacks. Military
orders, political documents, statements, or speeches by commanders can also demonstrate the
discriminatory intent of the attacks. As for proving the knowledge of individual defendants of
the wider context of the plan and their role in the plan, evidence to show knowledge of the
crimes committed by subordinates can be used. The chain of command, control over military
lower ranks, and reports via complaints by soldiers of attack or military follow through, all
evidenced by testimony or military orders either written or oral, can demonstrate knowledge of
crimes committed by subordinates. A commander’s response to the knowledge of the attacks
against civilians can also help demonstrate knowledge that his acts are part of the plan or policy.
Whether a commander punishes disorderly soldiers, the types of punishment, or the failure to
prevent further crimes can support a finding that a leader knew that his actions were part of the
plan or policy. All of this evidence is necessary to prove the intent or mens rea elements of
crimes against humanity, as defined in Article 5 of the ECCC statute.

IV.

CONCLUSION
This memorandum examined two issues related to crimes against humanity, as defined in

Article 5 of the ECCC Statute. The first issue is whether the offenses in Article 5’s definition of
crimes against humanity were part of international customary law in 1975. The second is what
evidentiary threshold and types of evidence are required to demonstrate the discriminatory intent
for crimes against humanity in the chapeau of Article 5.
All of the offenses under Article 5’s definition of crimes against humanity, with the
exception of rape, were part of international customary law and applicable to Cambodia in 1975.
The Hague Conventions, state declarations, Nuremberg Tribunals, Geneva Conventions, and the
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights occurred before 1975 and evidenced the formation of a
customary international norm recognizing crimes against humanity as a punishable offense under
customary international law. Thus, as customary international norms are binding on all states,213
Cambodia was bound by the norm establishing crimes against humanity as a punishable offense.
The offense of rape is less likely to be considered a crime under customary international law in
1975, as rape and sexual assault were largely unmentioned in international law until the
Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals in the 1990s.214 Finally, in relation to crimes against
humanity and customary international law in 1975, crimes against humanity did not include a
nexus to armed conflict under customary international law even in 1975. The Nuremberg
Principles, Control Council Law No. 10, and various soft law declarations demonstrate that even
by 1975 such a nexus to armed conflict for crimes against humanity was not applicable in
customary international law.215
The second issue relating to Article 5 of the ECCC Statute is what evidentiary threshold
and types of evidence are available to establish the requisite discriminatory intent for the listed
offenses of crimes against humanity. Both the discriminatory intent based on political, religious,
and ethical grounds and the individual’s knowledge of the wider context of civilian attacks and
of his role in the attacks for prosecution of leaders are elements of crimes against humanity, as
defined in Article 5. The evidentiary threshold to prove that the attacks were committed on the
basis of national, political, racial, etc. grounds requires a lesser burden than that of the
defendant’s specific intent, as the discriminatory, governmental policy against civilians becomes
well-known and proven.216 Furthermore, a wide variety of evidence is available to prove the
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intent behind crimes against humanity, including witness testimony (both expert and lay
witness), military documents, etc.217 This evidence can show the means and methods used in the
course of attack, the status of the victims, their numbers, the discriminatory nature of the attack,
the command structure of the Khmer Rouge, etc. From these factual findings, ECCC judges are
able to make the necessary inferences in determining the knowledge or mens rea of the accused,
as well as the lesser burdensome discriminatory intent on the basis of political, religious, etc.
grounds. However, due to the particular difficulties faced by the ECCC prosecutors, specifically
the elapsed time between the committed atrocities and prosecution and the cloak of secrecy
around the Khmer Rouge leadership,218 Cambodian prosecutors must be creative in the
presentation of evidence to the ECCC Tribunal. The existence of Khmer Rouge documents and
witness testimony, such as Duch’s,219 can provide the prosecution with the evidence needed to
demonstrate the individual knowledge and thus, liability of the defendants.
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